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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a solution to proactively
mitigate Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks in 5G core network
slicing using slice isolation. Network slicing is one of the key
technologies that allow 5G networks to offer dedicated resources
to different industries (services). However, a Distributed Denial-
of-Service attack could severely impact the performance and
availability of the slices as they could share the same physical
resources in a multi-tenant virtualized networking infrastructure.
Slice isolation is an essential requirement for 5G network slicing.
In this paper, we use network isolation to tackle the challenging
problem of Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks in 5G network
slicing. We propose the use of a mathematical model that can
provide on-demand slice isolation as well as guarantee end-to-end
delay for 5G core network slices. We evaluate the proposed work
with a mix of simulation and experimental work. Our results
show that the proposed isolation could mitigate Distributed
Denial-of-Service attacks as well as increase the availability of
the slices. We believe this work will encourage further research
in securing 5G network slicing.
Index Terms—5G slicing, network slicing, 5G security, 5G
reliability, 5G optimization, 5G isolation
I. INTRODUCTION
The key motivation to present the work in this paper is
that future mobile networks must provide services to a vast
array of applications and devices with competing and perhaps
conflicting requirements while simultaneously allowing flexi-
ble and agile deployment. 5G networks deal with this issue in
part by relying on network slicing which has emerged as a
key-enabler for proving heterogeneous services with different
requirements to enable agile and scalable deployment of the
5G network (applications) [1]. Network slicing takes advan-
tage of virtualized infrastructures, where multiple services
can be hosted on the same physical infrastructure, while at
the same time guaranteeing service level agreements (SLAs)
therefore allowing flexible and efficient utilization of limited
resources. In a 5G network, a slice could be instantiated
for a specific service. Fig. 1 shows examples of different
slices for autonomous vehicles (with a very low end-to-end
delay requirement), high-speed mobile broadband (with high
bandwidth requirements), or a dedicated slice for emergency
services. In Fig 1, the Common Control Network Functions
(CCNF) are shared among all three slices, and the Common
Control Plane (CCP) is only providing services to slice#1 and
slice#2.
Fig. 1: Logical view of network slicing in 5G Networks.
NextGen Core is virtualized and the VNFs of slice#1, slice#2
and slice#3 can be hosted on one or more physical servers. El-
ements used are: Network Slicing Selection Function (NSSF),
Authentication Server Function (AUSF), Policy Control Func-
tion (PCF), Session Management Function (SMF), Authenti-
cation Unit (AU), Security Anchor Function (SEAF), Home
Subscriber Server (HSS), User Plane Function (UPF)
A shift in the mobile network paradigm also mandates
changes in the security architecture with new security chal-
lenges that do not exist in the past or present mobile networks
[2]. In the current mobile network, if an attacker launches
flooding Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against
a mobile service, only that service will be affected, and there
is a very low risk of host resource starvation-based attacks in
current mobile networks (i.e., usually mobile network infras-
tructure is not virtualized). However, in a 5G network, a DDoS
against one slice might affect other services because they could
be tenants of the same shared virtualized infrastructure. An
important requirement for 5G network slicing is isolation [2].
Network slice isolation requires host resource isolation and
network communication isolation that could be achieved using
various techniques suggested in [3]. Each suggested technique
has its advantages and disadvantages. However, separating
hardware resources provides strong isolation. To the best of
our knowledge, the work proposed in this paper is the first in
5G core network slicing that proposes and evaluates the use
of slice resource isolation to mitigate DDoS attacks.
Distributed Denial-of-service attacks are difficult to miti-
gate. During a flooding DDoS attack, the attacker will try
to overwhelm the target network or service by sending a
large amount of traffic. The challenge is to keep the target
network or service available to the end users. A few waysVersion: March 2019
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to mitigate flooding DDoS attacks are; the target network
or service keep upscaling its resources, or telling upstream
routers (ISPs) to block the traffic near the sources to reduce
the impact. However, these solutions might not be possible
in all scenarios. Some recent examples are DDoS attack on
Github in 2015 [4] and 2018 [5], and Dyn in 2016 [6]. The
host resource starvation attack in a virtualized environment
is another type of DoS attack, where attacker try to exhaust
the hardware resources of the host [7] that could result in an
in-direct DoS attack on other hosted services (on the same
host).
In 5G virtualized network, multiple tenants will share the
same physical resources. A DDoS attack on one slice could
disrupt the services hosted on other slices. There could be two
attack vectors that can be used to affect other slices. If the
communication link is shared between multiple slices, then a
DDoS attack on one slice could impact other slices. The other
attack vector would be if both slices are hosted on the same
host then the attacker can take advantage of the co-hosting
and launch an attack on other slices. For instance, increased
Central Processing Unit (CPU) utilization of a slice could have
an adverse effect on the performance and availability of other
slices. It is possible to be hosted on the same host and not
share the same communication link. In the worst case, multiple
resource-intensive slices could be hosted on the same host and
have a common communication link.
In this paper, we try to mitigate the Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks using slice isolation. We utilize
a mathematical model to solve a security problem. In our
proposed solution, we use slice isolation as security constraints
for the optimization model and proactively mitigate DDoS
attacks. Our contributions are: (1) inter-slice isolation (com-
plete separation of host hardware resources between slices),
(2) intra-slice isolation (separation of host hardware resources
between the slice components), (3) guaranteeing the end-to-
end delay requirement for the slice and (4) optimal allocation
of slices to efficiently utilize available hardware infrastructure.
Inter-slice isolation provides mitigation against the DDoS
attacks because the hardware resources are not shared between
the slices and DDoS on one slice does not impact the other
slices. Whereas, intra-slice isolation provides better availabil-
ity for the slices since the components of the slice are hosted
on different hosts. Enabling intra-slice could reduce the impact
of DDoS attack and increase the availability of the target slice
as well as faster recovery of the service because the slice
operator may not need to deploy reactive mitigation defense
for all slices (e.g., migrating only affected slices).
The objective of our work is to provide inter-slice and intra-
slice isolation, guarantee the end-to-end delay, make efficient
use of system resources, and increase the availability of a
slice against the DDoS attacks. To achieve these objectives,
we propose the use of a security-focused optimization model
that allocates slices and fulfills different requirements of the
5G network slicing. We use a combination of simulation and
experimental work to evaluate our DDoS mitigation solution.
We note that we do not use slicing in 5G Radio Access
Network (RAN), we only focus on core slicing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the literature review on 5G slicing security and
the virtual network function placement in mobile networks. In
section III we discuss our threat model for the 5G network
slice isolation. Section V formulates optimization model for
5G network slicing. We discuss our evaluation methodology
and experiment setup in section VI. In the section VII, we
discuss our results and lastly, section VIII, we present our
conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Network Slicing Security: V. Sathi et al. [8] proposed
a novel protocol for securing intra-slice network communi-
cation. The proposed protocol is based on modified proxy
re-encryption and bilinear pairing on an elliptic curve. It
provides mutual trust between participating entities as well as
a distributed association between slice components in a secure
manner (if central orchestrator is unavailable). Intelligent
security focused auto-scaling algorithm has been proposed by
Y. Khettab et al. [9]. Authors leveraged the Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) and Software-Defined Network (SDN)
architecture to secure a network slice. SDN controller ONOS is
used to enable security as a service in the proposed algorithm.
The auto-scaling solution takes into consideration the startup
time of the VM as well as guaranteeing the resources at
the orchestrator level by setting minimum and maximum
resources for each slice. IoT is one of the major drivers behind
5G network development. An efficient and secure method is
required to authenticate a massive number of low powered
devices. J. Ni et al. [10] proposed a secure service-oriented
authentication framework for 5G-enabled IoT devices (ES3A).
The proposed framework guarantees privacy-focused secure
slice access and selection as well as a secure session key
exchange mechanism between IoT devices. A quantitative
analysis of network slice isolation has been proposed by Z.
Kotulski et al. [11]. The proposed framework is a layered
structure, and each layer has its network elements and isolation
level. Authors defined mathematical rules to calculate slice
isolation.
Virtual Network Function Placement in Mobile Net-
works: Recently, Virtual Network Function (VNF) placement
in the virtual mobile network has gained research communi-
ties’ interest. The main driving force is the architecture of the
5G network that heavily relies on virtualization. V. Sciancale-
pore et al. [12] have proposed a practical implementation of
network slicing. In the proposed model, authors assume that in
any given time slot, tenants can only request a single network
slice. The proposed model is built on the multi-armed bandit
problem, and the authors introduced three variations of the
multi-armed bandit to solve various aspects of the network
slice allocation. They simulated the optimization model using
MATLAB and compared the results with a greedy algorithm.
They also provided proof-of-concept implementation of the
network slicing. D. Dietrich et al. [13] proposed a linear
programming formulation for the placement of VNFs in the
LTE core network. In the proposed algorithm, they provided a
balance between optimality and time complexity. The authors
R. Ford et al. [14] proposed an optimal VNF placement for
the SDN-based 5G mobile-edge cloud. Their optimization
algorithm provides resilience by placing VNFs in distributed
data centers. They demonstrate in the evaluation that their
algorithm can reduce 75% of redundant data center capacity
while still maintaining the same resilience.
III. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we describe the threat model used in this
paper. Our threat model considers the 5G elements that are
involved in network slicing.
A. Assumptions
Our threat model assumes that:
• Network slicing is supported by the target network
• It is possible to modify the VNF configuration of a slice
• A network slice supports the installation of user-defined
functions
• The 5G core network uses virtualized network functions
• The EPC supports migration of the slice components
• On the servers, multi-tenancy is supported by the slice
operator
• It is possible to have slice-level authentication
• It is not possible to modify the hardware configurations
of the baremetal systems
• The slice operators’ network is functional
B. Adversaries
Our model considers two types of adversaries.
• Adversaries with administrative control: An Adversary
could be someone with administrative control of the slice.
This type could be a tenant, an insider (assigned by
the mobile operator to manage the slice), or an external
attacker who has compromised a slice.
• External adversaries: External attacker could be a user
of a slice or an external entity that could attack a slice.
C. Attacks on a slice in the multi-tenant networking environ-
ment
In this threat model, we consider two of the possible attacks
on a slice in the multi-tenant environment. These are two
attacks we used in our experimental evaluation.
1) DDoS flooding attack: Unlike LTE networks, which are
usually single tenant, multi-tenancy in 5G networks will be
a typical environment. For the flooding attacks, we assume
that the attacker is an external adversary (second type). The
attacker launches a DDoS attack that could flood the commu-
nication link(s) of the target slice (e.g., UDP flooding, TCP
sync attack, or any other type of DDoS flooding attack). DDoS
flooding attacks [15], [7] are not new or limited to the mobile
networks. They have existed in traditional networks, cloud
networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, software-defined networks
and in many other types of networks. In 5G networks, network
Fig. 2: Logical view of DDoS attack on a slice
slicing presents a new attack vector to perform DDoS attacks.
A high-level view of the DDoS attack is shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, we have two slices providing services to two
different class of devices (i.e., Mobile devices and IoT de-
vices). The Common Control Network Functions (CCNFs)
shared among both slices and provide slice selection and
authentication functions. In this scenario, we have a large
number of IoT devices attempting to authenticate with the
slice#2. This could result in a DDoS attack on slice#2’s
components (i.e., AUSF, SEAF’, and HSS). However, If both
slices share the same physical link in the core network (all or
some components of both slices could share the same physical
link), then slice#1 might be impacted, and it could result in
an in-direct DDoS on the slice#1.
2) Slice-initiated attack: There is a possibility that a slice
might initiate the attack in this multi-tenant environment. A
slice-initiated attack would require administrative privilege
because it might require modification of VNF/slice configu-
ration. We assume that the attacker has administrative control
of the slice (first type of adversary). An attacker could ex-
haust the resources of the VNF (e.g., 100% CPU or RAM
utilization) [7], [15]. The effect of a slice-initiated attack is
limited to the slices hosted on the same host(s). If one or more
components of a slice are hosted on the same physical host
as the adversarial slice VNF(s), then sustained high utilization
of hardware resources could degrade the performance of other
slices.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we describe our proposed solution, where
we provide optimal slice allocation and slice isolation while
fulfilling several requirements of 5G networks. We use intra-
slice isolation to provide more reliability and better availabil-
ity, inter-slice isolation for providing isolation between slices.
In the proposed solution, when slice allocation is requested,
the slice could require intra-slice isolation for high availability.
If there is a DDoS attack on the slice or a hardware failure, it
could have catastrophic effect if the entire slice is allocated on
one host. An essential requirement for 5G network slicing is
isolation [16]. The 3GPP states that "The 3GPP System shall
have the capability to provide a level of isolation between
network slices which confines a potential cyber-attack to a
single network slice" [17]. However, how network isolation
should be achieved is left up to the implementation of the
network slicing. In our solution, if a slice requires complete
isolation from other slices, the inter-slice isolation constraint
provides such functionality.
Currently, in our system, all the slice requests and isolation
requirements are provided as input to the optimization solu-
tion. The optimization solution provides us with an allocation
scheme for all the slices. We manually allocate all slices
according to the allocation scheme. By using intra-slice and
inter-slice constraints in our solution, we proactively try to
mitigate DDoS attacks.
V. OPTIMIZATION MODEL FORMULATION
In this section, we explain the optimization model used in
this paper. Inter-slice isolation, guaranteeing end-to-end delay,
and high reliability are essential requirements in 5G network
slicing [18]. Our security-focused optimization constraints
fulfill different isolation requirements. Inter-slice isolation will
depend on how the slicing is implemented. If multiple VNFs
are assigned to the same VM from different slices, then one
way to achieve inter-slicing isolation would be to assign the
only slice per VM (container). In this paper, we consider one
VNF per VM (container); therefore it already provides some
level of isolation. However, we consider complete separation
of hardware inter-slice isolation (such that no components of
different slices can be allocated to the same host).
A. Network and Request Model
We use an undirected graph Gp = (Np, Lp) to represent the
physical 5G core network topology. All the nodes in the net-
work (i.e. servers, switches, routers and other devices present
in the network) are represented by Np , and Lp denotes all the
physical links between the nodes. A slice request is denoted
by a directed graph Gv = (Nv, Lv), where Nv = (Nc ∪ Nd)
contains all the slice virtual network functions, the control
and data plane virtual functions are represented by Nc and
Nd , respectively and Lv represents requested links. Each edge
in the directed graph is represented by (i, j) ∈ Lv . Each slice
request is associated with end-to-end delay (dE2E ), intra-slice
isolation (Kc
rel
,Kd
rel
), inter-slice isolation (γc, γd) and each
VNF in a slice is associated with a computing demand (Ri),
and bandwidth (BW) requirement between VNF i and VNF j
(Ri j). The description of all variable is provided in table I.
B. Objective function
In earlier work [19], we used a similar objective function
and general constraints. They are influenced by prior work
[13] by Dietrich et al., especially the first term of the objective
function and general constraints 3, 4, and 6.
Minimize∑
i∈Nv
∑
k∈Np
(
σk + Ri
)
uik +
∑
(i, j)∈Lv
∑
(e, f )∈Lp
(e, f )
Te f y
i j
e f (1)
The objective function (1) is to allocate the slice to least
utilized physical nodes and find minimum delay path. The
first term will assign the slice request to the least utilized
servers. The second term will find the minimum delay path.
Minimizing both terms will result in the assignment of a
TABLE I: Variable Description
Parameter Description
Np Set of physical Nodes
Lp Physical links between nodes
σk Current CPU allocation of physical node k
σe f Curr. BW allocation of physical link between nodes e, f
σmax
k
Maximum CPU capacity of physical node k
σmax
e f
Max. BW capacity of physical link between nodes e, f
Te f Physical link delay between node e, f
∆k Physical node k processing delay
∆i VNF i processing delay
Nc Requested set of slice control plane functions
Nd Requested set of slice data plane functions
Nv Requested set of slice VNFs (Nc ∪ Nd )
Lv Requested virtual links of a slice
Ri Requested CPU resource by a VNF i
Ri j Requested BW resource between VNF i, j
dE2E Requested End-to-End delay
Kc
rel
Requested intra-slice isolation for Control Plane
Kd
rel
Requested intra-slice isolation for Data Plane
γc Requested inter-slice isolation for Control Plane
γd Requested inter-slice isolation for Data Plane
network slice to the least utilized servers, and it will find a
path with least delay between the slice components.
The objective function is subjected to several Mixed-Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) general and security-related con-
straints that we will explain next.
C. General Constraints
1) Slice Assignment, Placement and Resource Budget∑
k∈Np
uik = 1 ∀i ∈ Nv (2)
∑
i∈Nv
(
Ri + σk
)
uik ≤ σmaxk ∀k ∈ Np (3)
∑
(i, j)∈Lv
(Ri j + σi j
e f
)yi j
e f
≤ σmaxef ∀(e, f ) ∈ Lp (4)
∑
i∈Nv
Ri ≤
∑
k∈Np
(
σmaxk − σk
)
(5)
∑
f ∈Np
(e, f )
(
y
i j
e f
− yi j
f e
)
=
(
uie − u je
)
i , j, ∀(i, j) ∈ Lv, ∀e ∈ Np
(6)
uik ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ Np, ∀i ∈ Nv (7)
y
i j
e f
≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ Lv, ∀(e, f ) ∈ Lp (8)
The constraint (2) ensures that each VNF is assigned to
an exactly one server. Constraints (3) and (4) guarantee
that allocated VNF resources do not exceed the phys-
ical servers’ processing capacity and link bandwidth,
respectively. A slice CPU demand should not exceed
the remaining CPU capacity of the entire system. This
is ensured by constraint (5) since partial allocation of
a slice is not the desired behavior. The conservation
of flows, i.e., the sum of all incoming and outgoing
traffic in the physical nodes that do not host VNFs
should be zero is enforced by the constraint (6), and
this constrains also ensures that there is a path between
VNFs. Constraints (7) and (8) ensures that ui
k
and yi j
e f
are binary and integer, respectively.
2) End-to-End Delay:
©­­­«
∑
(i, j)∈Lv
∑
(e, f )∈Lp
e, f
Te f y
i j
e f
+
∑
i∈Nv
©­«∆i +
∑
k∈Np
∆kuik
ª®¬
ª®®®¬ ≤ dE2E
(9)
Te f =
σe f
σmax
ef
δ + Te f ,init ∀(e, f ) ∈ Lp (10)
Constraint (9) guarantees end-to-end delay for a slice in
the current network state. End-to-end delay includes link
delay, VNF processing delay, and physical node process-
ing delay. Each time when a virtual link (i, j) ∈ Lv is
assigned to a physical link (e, f ) ∈ Lp , it increases Te f .
Te f is a function of link utilization, and it is calculated
using eq. (10), where Te f ,init is the initial delay assigned
to the link (e, f ) ∈ Lp and δ is the maximum increase
in delay. We explain in section VI-D how these values
are calculated empirically.
D. Security-related Constraints
1) Intra-Slice Isolation∑
i∈Nc
uik ≤ Kcrel ∀k ∈ Np,Kcrel = 1, 2, 3... (11a)∑
i∈Nd
uik ≤ Kdrel ∀k ∈ Np,Kdrel = 1, 2, 3... (11b)
It might be required to have different levels of intra-slice
isolation for control and data plane. In constraints (11),
Kc
rel
and Kd
rel
ensure the intra-slice isolation for control
plane and data plane, respectively. Intra-slice isolation
can improve the availability of a slice. For instance, if
all components are hosted on one host, then a DDoS on
one component could lead to complete unavailability of
the slice as well as longer migration time (if required).
However, if there was some level of isolation then DDoS
on a single component might not result in complete
unavailability and the operator would not have to migrate
the entire slice but some components which could result
in faster recovery.
2) Inter-Slice Isolation
σkuik = 0 ⇐⇒ γc = 1 ∀k ∈ Np, ∀i ∈ Nv, γc ∈ {0, 1}
(12a)
σkuik = 0 ⇐⇒ γd = 1 ∀k ∈ Np, ∀i ∈ Nv, γd ∈ {0, 1}
(12b)
Inter-slice isolation could provide more security in a
multi-tenant environment. Constraint (12) provides the
required hardware inter-slice isolation. In the allocation
scheme, it might be required to have inter-slice isolation
between control plane function (for security reasons)
but not in the data plane functions or vice versa. Inter-
slice isolation for control plane or data plane is only
provided when γc = 1 or γd = 1, respectively. We note
that our inter-slice isolation does not provide bandwidth
isolation.
VI. EVALUATION AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The implementation of a complete 5G network is still in
early stages and evaluating a fine-grained network slicing
solution like ours in a 5G network is very challenging. There
are very few testbeds and even fewer available to academia for
testing and experimentation. We are not aware of any publicly
available simulator or emulators that can provide complete
simulation or emulation of 5G RAN and core network with
slicing support. Another challenging issue is the cost of 5G
hardware and software. Therefore, we made the best use of
currently available tools (open source) and generic hardware
to evaluate our solution.
A. Experiment Setup
To evaluate our solution, we developed a testbed using
six physical servers. We used three servers to allocate slices,
two as DDoS nodes and one as a client as shown in Fig.
3. The hardware specification for PS1, PS2, PS3, A1, and
A2 are: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5420 @ 2.50GHz (4 cores),
RAM 8GB, and network bandwidth 100Mb/s. In each of our
experiments, we deploy 12 core network slices; each slice
consisting of three components (network functions). The slice
allocation is static in our experiments where we input all the
slice requests and requirements in our optimization algorithm,
and it provides us with an allocation scheme that we use
for the entire experiment. AMPL [20] is used to model the
optimization algorithm, and CPLEX (ilogcp) 12.8.0 is used as
MILP solver. OpenVZ [21] is used for virtualization. It is an
open source container-based virtualization platform. OpenVZ
allows each container to have a specific amount of CPU,
RAM, and Hard Drive (HDD). Each container (which hosts
one VNF) performs and executes like a stand-alone server. We
have installed the CentOS 6 [22] operating system in every
container. We used Linux Traffic control (tc) [23] to allocate
bandwidth for each container.
B. Combining simulations with the use of testbed
As demonstrated in Fig. 3, our evaluation setup uses a
combination of a simulation setup and an experimental testbed.
We perform our evaluation in two steps. In the first step, we
use ns3 [24] to simulate the radio part of the 5G network where
320 mobile nodes generate UDP traffic and send it to the node
C (see the Fig. 3). At node C, we collect all traffic traces
destined for the slices in a pcap file. This trace file collected
from the simulation is used for all subsequent experiments
Fig. 3: Evaluation Setup. The components used in the ns3 simulation are User Equipment (UE), evolved NodeBs (eNB),
Mobility Management Entity (MME), Packet Data Gateway (PGW) and C is a traffic trace collection node. PS1-PS3 are the
slice allocation servers, and A1-A2 are DDoS nodes. TF (pcap) is the traffic trace file collected in the simulation at C and
replayed at A1 and A2 using tcpreplay
that happen in the second step. In the second step which is
performed on the testbed, we replay pcap file at servers A1
and A2 using tcpreplay [25] to perform DDoS attack on the
slices. The two DDoS attack nodes A1 and A2 are used for a
high bandwidth DDoS attack (at approximately 200Mb/s).
The reason for using the two-step approach is that we
faced some challenges with scaling the experiments. The
combination of a large amount of traffic generated by UEs and
the emulated link between PGW and the rest of the network
(slices), it became infeasible to perform DDoS using this
setup. There was too much overhead in terms of processing
requirement and network traffic. Therefore, we collected traffic
traces at node C and used tcpreplay at A1 and A2 to perform
DDoS attack.
For 5G-specific components, we used ns3 [24] with
mmWave module [26] to simulate the 5G RAN network and
used emulated link from Packet Data Gateway (PGW) to
connect the slices. We were able to implement Network Slicing
Selection Function (NSSF) that can select the slices based on
the Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI)
received from the UEs or assign NSSAI to the UEs if it is
unknown. In our ns3 implementation, if a UE does not know
the NSSAI, the NSSF will assign the NSSAI, and it will
redirect traffic to the correct slice (UEs-MME-NSSF-PGW-C).
After the NSSAI assignment, the UEs will bypass the NSSF
and directly go the destination slice (UEs-MME-PGW-C).
C. Test Application
To test the impact of the different attacks, we measure
certain performance parameters for a test application that
we implemented on the testbed. We implemented a simple
authentication protocol. In our implementation, we assume that
the client (Green node in Fig. 3) already has an NSSAI and it
directly sends traffic to a specific slice. In our experiments, all
slices can receive Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic. We note that we are
using SEAF, AUSF, and HSS to describe the basic function
of our authentication mechanism. They are not complete
implementation of 5G functions. Our HSS database has 1000
records, and it uses a binary search algorithm.
The messaging sequence of the authentication procedure is
listed here and is also shown in Fig. 4.
1) A client sends an authentication request to the slice
SEAF.
2) SEAF performs pre-processing and forwards it to the
AUSF of the slice.
3) AUSF forwards the request to the HSS and waits for the
response.
4) The HSS performs a database search
5) HSS sends the result of the search to the AUSF
6) AUSF sends success or failure message to the SEAF on
the basis of information received from the HSS
7) SEAF forwards the information to the client
Fig. 4: Flow diagram of the authentication procedure used in
the experiments (V1, V2 and V3 represents virtual network
functions)
D. Evaluation Methodology
To evaluate the performance impact of DDoS attack on
slices, we collected response time and round-trip time (RTT)
between the client and the slice and the average slice band-
width available to the client. We used Ping between the client
and slice S1 (SEAF) to calculate the RTT. To calculate the
average available bandwidth for the entire slice, we measured
bandwidth between client and slice S1 (SEAF) and between
the slice S1’s components using iperf [27]. The slice S1 is
providing authentication service to a client and the slice S4 is
under DDoS attack.
We empirically calculated the values for Te f ,init and δ
(eq. 10) by measuring RTT between client and slice S1’s
components and between different components of the slice
S1. We measure RTT between client and slice S1 as well
as between different components of slice S1 when there is
almost no traffic in the network and take an average of all
collected data to estimate Te f , init. To estimate the value of
δ, we increase utilization of all available links for slice S1 to
approximately 100% and once again calculate RTT. We take
an average of all the collected data, and it gives us a value of
δ. The rest of the parameters used in the experiment are listed
in Table II.
TABLE II: Experiment parameters
Parameter Value
Np 3
σmax
k
10.0 GHz
Krel 1-3
Nv 3
Ri j 5-12 Mbps
Ri 0.4-1.4 GHz
∆i 0.1-1.0 ms
∆k 0.5 ms
δ 16.85 ms
Te f , init 0.15 ms
Total Slice Requests 12
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss our results. We devised two attack
scenarios to realize the threat we described in section III-C.
In both scenarios, the client is sending one authentication
request per sec to the slice S1 (SEAF), and the majority of
the network traffic is directed towards either S1 or S4. To get
a baseline (i.e., without isolation) results for comparison, we
used a greedy algorithm. In the greedy algorithm, the slices
are allocated on First Come First Serve basis. Once the PS1
is fully utilized, we start allocating slices to the next server
and so on. In the figures, NoIsolation represents the results of
greedy allocation. Results for the different levels of intra-slice
isolation are represented by Krel = 1,Krel = 2, and Krel = 3.
Due to the way our testbed is designed (with three physical
servers), coincidentally, our optimization solution allocated
slices in such a way that at intra-slice isolation level Krel = 3,
the two slices we are concerned with in the evaluation (S1
and S4) were allocated entirely on two different servers which
resulted in complete inter-slice isolation. Therefore, in all
the presented results, Krel = 3 is also providing inter-slice
isolation1 (i.e., similar to setting γc = 1 or γd = 1). We note
again that this coincidence is due to the way the testbed is set
up and may not be repeated in other experimental settings.
For each value of Krel , we repeat every experiment three
times. For every new value of Krel , a new optimization solu-
tion is calculated, and slices are reallocated accordingly before
1We do have results (not presented here) obtained by setting γc = 1 or
γd = 1. The difference in the results is approximately 1-2% compared to
ones presented here for Krel = 3. That could be due to the randomness of
the network/CPU or other parameters. The results included in this paper are
obtained with γc = 0 or γd = 0
0 25 50 75 100 125 150
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Authentication Request #
R
es
po
ns
e
Ti
m
e
(m
s)
NoIsolation Krel = 1 Krel = 2 Krel = 3
Fig. 5: Response Time for flooding DDoS attack scenario.
Attack traffic starts at approximately authentication request#30
and stops at approximately authentication request#130
the corresponding experiments are run. In our previous work
[19], we discussed the overall CPU and bandwidth utilization
of the system, and average solver runtime for different levels
of intra-slice isolation.
A. DDoS flooding attack
In evaluating the DDoS flooding attack scenario [7]. The
target was slice S4 (attack details are in section III-C1). Our
client node is sending authentication requests to slice S1, and
we use ns3 UDP traffic traces to launch a DDoS attack from
A1 and A2 on slice S4. In this experiment, CPU is not a
bottleneck. Fig. 5 shows the response time at the client. We
can see a very high response time for NoIsolation and lowest
for Krel = 3 (which also represents inter-slice isolation).
When there is no isolation present between slices, all the
components of different slices are sharing the same physical
link. The Linux Traffic Controller tc configures the kernel
packet scheduler for all the virtual network function (VNF)
hosted on the same machine and in this case a total of six
components for both slices (for simplicity, we can ignore the
other slices for our discussion). When slice S4 is under DDoS,
we can see a significant impact on the response time of the
slice S1’s client. However, the effect is substantially reduced
when Krel = 1 and Krel = 2. The main reason is that a
packet spends less time waiting in the kernel queue for each
VNF as compared to the NoIsolation case. For instance, in
the NoIsolation scenario, there will be a minimum of six
queues at the kernel (one for each VNF). Whereas, when
Krel = 1 and Krel = 2, the minimum number of queues will
be reduced from six to two and three, respectively. Another
factor that improved the response time for the client is that
there are multiple physical links available for the slice S1 to
communicate with each other and the client. We do not see
a trade-off (in terms of cost) of using Krel = 1 and Krel = 2
because the scale of the network is small and the solution
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Fig. 6: Round-Trip Time for flooding DDoS attack scenario.
Attack traffic starts at approximately Ping request#30 and
stops at approximately Ping request#130
for both values of Krel is not the worst-case scenario (see
section VII-C). In previous work [19], we simulated a larger
network where the cost of different values of Krel was more
evident. In this paper, since we are using an actual testbed
with a smaller scale, the cost is not evident. We expect it to
show in a larger scale testbed. When Krel = 3, both slices
are allocated on a separate physical server, and the traffic is
completely isolated from the interference of other slices (inter-
slice isolation), which provides the best results.
We calculated RTT from the client to slice S1 (SEAF) as
shown in Fig. 6. We can see a significant advantage of our
isolation solution at all level of Krel as compared to NoIso-
lation. However, the RTT is not as high as the response time
(i.e, Fig. 5). The RTT is calculated only from the client to the
S1 (SEAF), but in the response time, an authentication request
passes through all three nodes that could add significant delay
(i.e., see authentication message flow in Fig. 4).
Fig. 7 shows the average available bandwidth in the en-
tire slice S1. We measured bandwidth using iperf between
client and S1 (SEAF) and between slice S1’s virtual network
functions (we only plot average bandwidth). The slice S1 is
allocated 10Mb/s bandwidth. As we can see, bandwidth for
slice S1 drops to less then 1Mb/s for NoIsolation and these
results also provide some insight for such high response time
(Fig. 5) and RTT (Fig. 6). There is significantly less bandwidth
available in the entire slice S1. However, our isolation solution
guarantees a high percentage of the allocated bandwidth. The
high bandwidth utilization at the beginning is due to initial
burst traffic.
B. Slice-initiated attack
In the slice-initiated attack scenario (see section III-C2 for
more details), we overload the CPU of slice S4 using a simple
Python script and measure the impact on slice S1. There
is no flooding DDoS attack happening in this scenario. The
impact of CPU bottleneck depends on various factors, e.g.,
applications running on the host system and within containers
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Fig. 7: Average available bandwidth for the slice in flooding
DDoS attack scenario. Attack traffic starts at approximately
30s and stops at approximately 130s
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Fig. 8: Response Time for slice-initiated attack scenario.
Attack traffic starts at approximately authentication request#30
and stops at approximately authentication request#130
(VMs), the host operating system and virtualization platform.
In our experiments, we tried to keep the impact of the factors
mentioned above to a minimum2 and measure the response
time and RTT for the client as shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9,
respectively. As shown, the response time is relatively high for
the client when there is no isolation (NoIsolation). Whereas,
our isolation solution for all levels of Krel shows a minimal
impact of sustained high CPU utilization. The minor variation
between response times for different levels of Krel could be
due to the factors we mentioned earlier.
For RTT, we see much more variation when there is
2We do not launch any additional applications between different experi-
ments as well as at the beginning of each experiment, we measure CPU and
RAM utilization to confirm that they are at a similar level.
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Fig. 9: Round-Trip Time for slice-initiated attack scenario.
Attack traffic starts at approximately Ping request#30 and
stops at approximately Ping request#130
NoIsolation. The reason could be that when a Ping request
arrives at the destination VNF, sometimes the CPU might
be less loaded, and it can process the request sooner, and
other times it might be more loaded and respond more slowly.
However, CPU bottleneck has a minimal impact for all levels
of Krel . The impact of slice-initiated attacks could have been
worse if other hosted slices were using some CPU intensive
applications.
C. Current Limitations
Worst-case scenario allocation: In our current solution,
a worst-case scenario would be, if a significant number of
VNFs from different slices that require either high bandwidth
or perform CPU intensive tasks (could be a combination of
both) are allocated on the same physical host(s). The allocation
scheme do not take into consideration what type of VNFs are
previously allocated on any specific host(s). So if they were
of the resource-intensive type, and they happen to reach their
maximum load at similar times, a DDoS attack on a slice at
that time could pose significant mitigation challenges.
Other limitations: The allocation scheme is static as it
does not re-allocate previously allocated slices to make more
efficient use of available resources (or newly added resources).
The migration of VNF(s) poses another challenge in the
current solution. There is no mechanism in place for migrating
a VNF(s). For VNF(s) migration, in some cases, it might
be beneficial to migrate the under attack VNF(s) rather than
other hosted VNF(s), or in other cases, it might be better to
migrate slice components that are not under attack. Lastly,
our allocation scheme does not consider the processing delay
added by the intermediate nodes (e.g., router, switches, etc.).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In our solution, we used slice isolation to reduce the
impact of DDoS attacks on a simple network service (slice
authentication). We evaluated our solution using a combination
of simulation and an experimental testbed for flooding DDoS
attacks and slice-initiated attacks. In both attack scenarios,
complete slice isolation provides the best mitigation. Whereas,
at different intra-slice isolation levels Krel = 1 and Krel = 2,
the impact of DDoS on the response time and round-trip time
is significantly reduced as compared to the no isolation case
(NoIsolation). During the DDoS attack scenario, the average
bandwidth available to the client is a fraction of the requested
bandwidth, when there is no isolation. However, the impact
of DDoS on average available bandwidth with our solution
enabled is minimal.
We note that inter-slice isolation provides strong resource
isolation. However, it can reduce the efficiency of resource
utilization. The intra-slice isolation provides better control
over the trade-off between security, availability and resource
utilization.
Currently, it is very challenging to do large scale 5G
testing. We believe that our results, while obtained through a
small testbed, have significant value in this new research area
because they are obtained through actual experiments (rather
than pure theoretical or pure simulation evaluation). We will
continue to look for ways to scale up the testing experiments
to see if the results will be the same for larger testbeds.
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